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March-April, 1979 - 38 Union Square, Somerville, MA 02143 #129 
a call to resist illegitimate authority 
VIETNAM AND 
CAMBODIA 
LOU AND ERYL KUBICKA 
The fallowing is excerpted from a report presented by 
the Kubickas to the Board of Directors of the American 
Friends Service Committee in January. The Kubickas 
have recently returned from South East Asia, where 
they lived for several years. The views expressed are, of 
course, those of the authors and not necessarily of the 
AFSC. 
At this point fast moving developments in the Vietnam-
Kampuchea war would seem to preclude sure predictions. 
Yet most observers have already concluded that the Pol 
Pot regime will never again be able to return to Phnom 
Penh. Be that as it may, Pol Pot has vowed to fight a 
guerilla war and thus it is conceivable that the fighting 
and suffering might go on for a protracted period. World 
opinion as well as' 'great power'' strategic considerations 
may well play at least a minimal role in determining the 
ultimate outcome of the present fighting, and these two 
factors could conceivably become very significant. We 
believe that it is important that we attempt to understand 
the factors that have led to yet another full-scale, tragic 
war on the Indochina peninsula, and of considerable 
importance to consider positions and actions concerned 
observers might take with respect to this war if it 
continues - as we believe it will. 
Our understanding is that the war is neither primarily a 
border war, nor is it a conflict inevitable because of 
centuries-old racial animosities between the Khmer and 
Viet peoples. the conflict began between two communist 
parties and is rooted mainly in ideological differences 
concerning the nature of bilateral cooperation, inter-
national alignment, and the nature of revolutionary 
foreign policy. However, to maintain that the conflict is 
so rooted is not to deny that there are many additional 
factors, some of which explain why the conflict has 
escalated as it has. Just to mention two such non-
ideological factors: the understandable historical but 
immediate fears of Vietnamese domination on the part of 
r:<JrHinued on page 4 
THE WASHINGTON 
ELEVEN 
ELLEN CANT AROW 
I can't remember when I first met Grace Paley. It was 
in the mid-Sixties, at a meeting, perhaps, or at one or 
another anti-war rally. Mutual friends brought us back 
together over the years. I grew to know her at rallies, at 
demonstrations, at meetings. She would greet me with a 
hug, a kiss, a hearty slap on the back, and a "Hello, 
Darling!" uttered in a girlish voice full of New York. 
Which wasn't special with me: it's a way Grace has with 
anyone with whom she feels a human bond. 
It was later that I began reading her short stories, 
masterpieces reminiscent of Isaac Babel, the Russian 
master of the tough, funny, ironic, and lyrical short 
story. There are only two slender volumes of Paley 
stories - The Little Disturbances of Man (1973) and 
Enormous Changes at the Last Minute (1974). That she 
puts out as rarely as certain cacti produce flowers -
around one story a year - owes to her meticulousness as 
an artist and to her fullness of life: "My politics," she 
recently told a reporter from New York's Soho Weekly 
News, "interfere with my writing and my writing inter-
feres with both and both interfere with my walking 
around the street like I like to do - so alright." 
So all right. One story a year, and continued partici-
pation in the great social movements of our time is okay 
by me. Grace has come to represent not only the world 
of great writing but concern for the simply human, 
which has sometimes seemed elusive in the Decade of 
Disco. It was concern for the simply human that moved 
Grace Paley and ten other members of the War Re-
sisters League (WRL) last September to step out from 
continued on page 2 
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their guided tour of the White House and onto the front 
lawn, where they unfurled a banner: NO NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS - NO NUCLEAR POWER - U.S.A. OR 
U.S.S.R. 
At the same moment seven other WRL members 
staged a similar demonstration in Moscow's Red 
Square. They were detained briefly and sent on their 
way. The D.C. group, after an arrest and a thirty-hour 
detention, were slapped with the heaviest possible 
charge, ''unlawful entry,'' which carries a maximum 
penalty of $100 fine and/or six month's imprisonment. 
"It's as though," Grace told a Village Voice reporter 
last December, "in the midst of the terrible noise of 
impending war, someone dropped a feather and the 
administration said, 'Did you hear that? Arrest those 
guys!' " 
Last week Judge Donald Smith, Nixon appointee to 
the District of Columbia Superior Court, gave the 
Eleven the stiff est sentence he could have imposed 
without putting them in jail - $100 fine or ninety days 
in jail; 180 days suspended sentence; and two to three 
, years' probation, during which the Eleven are barred 
from participation in any activism in Washington. All 
Eleven have paid the fine, and it is likely - pending 
group consensus - that they will appeal the decision. 
I went to Washington intending to do a profile of 
Grace Paley. But from the moment the courtroom 
proceedings began I was convinced that Grace was only 
part of a much larger picture: the story of nuclear 
armaments that began in the Cold War against Russia 
and is still unfolding in today's antinuclear movement. 
Monday morning. It is impossible not to spot the crowd 
in the very clean, very new caverns of the glistening 
court building. About 300 have gathered on the second 
floor by nine in the morning, a mix of young people and 
Fifties and Sixties pacifists. The prevailing dress is 
frayed corduroys, worn wool slacks, stocking caps, 
aging ski parkas. It's a cheery, haimish, peacefully 
browsing crowd. Into this scene, on a note peculiar for 
its mingled ominousness and absurdity - a note that 
will continue sounding all morning - a court officer 
tells the crowd to line up in "orderly" fashion. His 
voice is sharp with anxiety and high officiousness. 
Several court officers move through the crowd, contain-
ing it like sheepdogs, streamlining it into a long queue to 
the left and the right of the courtroom door. 
Containment seems the order of the day. ''Eleven 
more will have to leave!" comes yet another sharp order 
in the same tone of faintly suppressed hysteria, once 
some fifty people, including the Eleven and their fami-
lies, are seat~d in the tiny, carpeted, soundproof court-
room. Its capacity: forty-eight, not counting the jury 
box, where the defendants seat themselves at first. 
The drama is like courtroom proceedings of the 
Sixties: a morality play. The sides shape up, Grace Paley 
becoming simply one of eleven dissidents against the 
State. The judge, of course, is the State. Behind the 
2 
dark-rimmed glasses one can't see the eyes, but as each 
of the Eleven testifies and as the judge interposes 
comments and pronounces sentences seriatim, one ima-
gines the eyes are a nondescript brown or gray, good 
covers for a zealous soul. Invited to speak, the defend-
ants do so, one by one. Seen from behind, Karen 
Malpede, the second of the Eleven to be judged, looks 
very young and thin. "I sincerely believe it is possible to 
live in a peaceful world," she begins. "We have the 
responsibility of giving a forum to that idea. . . some-
times our actions are faltering because we are just 
beginning." Judge Smith leans forward, glacially pater-
nalistic. The glasses glitter: "You could have gotten a 
permit. You should not have come here unlawfully, you 
know. Do you understand what I'm saying?" 
Others follow, their observations punctuated by the 
judge's questions and the refrain, "Do you understand 
what I'm saying?" Clearly the defendants understand. 
They hold fast. "If I saw young children playing with a 
carton of dynamite," says Gail Bederman, a twenty-six-
year-old actress from New York, "I'd have a moral 
responsibility to stop them. When I see grown men 
playing with forces that threaten to annihilate the 
world, I'd be behaving irresponsibly if I didn't try to 
stop them.'' 
"We chose the White House and Red Square so tlrat 
people would pay more attention to what we were trying 
to do," asserts Ralph DeGia, a sixty-four-year-old 
WRL staff member. "In 1961 there was a San 
Francisco-to-Moscow walk. We were asking the people 
of the world to disarm. People said, "We can't trust the 
Russians.' But in Russia people said, 'We can't trust the 
Americans.' We're saying something to the people of 
the world. I'd rather be with my children than be here 
today, but I'm doing this to save my children, as well as 
other people's." 
There is much self-conscious drama in all this. In the 
small vault of the courtroom, with Smith as a foil, it is 
very effective. I look around and realize that the several 
court officers have been drawn into the debate. They are 
watching each defendant with expressions of some 
interest. Smith is impassive but relaxes often into what 
seems like jocularity. Really, he is playing with the 
defendants, toying with them, cat and mouse. 
The defendants come across in varying degrees of 
political sophistication or naivete. Some are long-time 
pacifists, others are relatively new to the movement. I 
find myself liking them all very much. I like their 
morality, the simplicity of their message, their plain 
decency and mutual support. Grace Paley comes last, 
kisses a small, white-haired veteran pacifist, Karl 
Bissinger, who has just gotten three years' probation. 
By now the audience is beginning to enjoy the presenta-
tions and a few people smile expectantly. Smith: "Miss 
Paley, have you nothing to say?" Paley (matter-of-fact): 
"Nothing." Smith (incredulous): "Nothing!?" Laugh-
ter ripples around the courtroom. Paley: "We were 
trying to speak beyond the range of our own voices, and 
we succeeded. We stepped on the lawn to be heard .... 
we wanted to do the simplest, quietest, gentlest, most 
forceful thing. The event was made disruptive by the 
police, who flew in and got hysterical .... In a world so 
full of bombs being piled up, so full of money being 
spent on war, it was necessary. Our own city, New 
York, has been bombed three times over by the Defense 
budget. Anyone who comes to New York or Washing-
ton says, "Why, there's been a war here.' And there 
has." What troubles Smith, he says, is that Grace Paley 
has been sentenced on previous occasions for similar 
offenses. "I'm getting older, I'll have to stop soon," 
she says, the Yiddish intonations strong. Laughter from 
some of the onlookers. "Do you mean," banters Smith, 
"you're thinking of retiring?" He's toying with her 
again as he's toyed with all the defendants. "The White 
House Forces," Smith addresses Grace squarely for the 
first time, it seems, "didn't know who you were. One of 
the things they have to look out for is a terrorist 
attack." The diminutive Paley stands, reflective while 
some people in the audience look incredulous: the 
fantasy is preposterous. "There could have been," 
Smith repeats, "other people in the White House who 
could stage a terrorist attack. So what you did was really 
very disruptive.'' I am transported back to elementary 
school, down to the basement where we sat, backs 
against the wall, knees up, heads down, waiting for the 
glass to splinter inward, waiting for the Russians to 
come. The old Cold War hysteria, impenetrable by any 
reason since it's mass paranoia, a mass pathology, is 
seeping up around us like swamp gas. It is the same 
feeling pervasive in the hall as the court officers imposed 
"order" on the crowd earlier. 
"I've received a lot of letters," continues Smith to 
Paley, "probably more about you than about any of the 
others. The thread of those letters is a misunderstanding 
of why you are before the court ... they seemed to think 
the court was something repressive, a tool of the 
Establishment to crush dissent." The onlookers ex-
change glances heavy with irony. I balk at any knee-jerk 
reaction. The court isn't actually crushing all dissent, it 
is simply practicing what Herbert Marcuse calls "repres-
sive tolerance." Dissent is okay as long as you practice it 
according to law. Picket lawfully in front of the White 
House. Block no driveways. Had the Eleven done all of 
that they wouldn't have been arrested: the press would 
have ignored them. Smith is against all effective dissent, 
and what dissent is worth its salt but an effective 
dissent? 
Outside the courtroom the crowd waits, and as we 
come out they cheer. At least ten, perhaps a dozen, 
helmeted and visored tactical police advance like giant 
crabs, nightsticks held rigidly at horizontal position, 
crotch level. "Just move along, that's it, move along." 
A few people try talking with the TPF but the TPF are 
schooled against human interaction with the crowds 
they control. They advance, herding the straggling mass 
through the gleaming hall and down the escalator. 
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At the top of the escalator I begin talking with 
another officer. Not a TPF member, he is in regular 
blue uniform. He is young with light coffee-colored skin 
and childish white teeth. He looks very boyish. "What's 
this all about?" he asks. I explain. "Oh, they stepped 
on the lawn?" he demands. "Yeah, they came armed 
with leaflets. A dangerous bunch," I reply. He smiles. 
"Listen," I hazard, "what do you think about this 
nuclear stuff?" Another pause. "Well, I was lying in 
bed the other night," comes the .answer, "and I was 
thinking about my little boy. Like, I wondered if he 
would live to be twenty-one." "How old is your little 
boy?" I manage to ask. "One year old," he says, and 
then: "Did you ever have that bad dream?" I think of 
1958, when I saw my first anti-nuclear film. It was 
partly about Hiroshima, and it broke forever the hold 
of the first Cold War on my childhood. I think of a 
report, published February 6 in the Boston Globe: 
fallout from atomic weapons tests in Nevada twenty-six 
years ago may be the cause of cancers just now dis-
covered in adults who were children then. I think of 
what is now considered "safe" radiation doses from 
natural and manmade (e.g., nuclear power plant) 
sources: any is unsafe, say some. The others talk about 
rads and millirems and it would take a whole article 
merely to explain the vocabulary and inter-scientific 
squabbles. All such thoughts are the work of a second. 
"Yes, I have had that dream," I reply. "I think 
everyone has." 
It is in the simply human that the movement against 
the Cold War had its roots. And clearly, the movement 
lives on. Just days before the sentencing, an evening 
benefit reading in Boston by Karen Lindsey, Marge 
Piercy, Denise Levertov, and Grace Paley drew a crowd 
of almost 900 people to the Arlington Street Church. At 
a similar evening in New York February 7, around 750 
braved a heavy snowfall to listen to Toni Morrison, 
E.L. Doctorow, and others. Several hundred attended a 
rally called to send off three busloads of New Yorkers to 
Washington. And after the sentencing, at a rally in front 
of the White House, tactical police arrested twenty-two 
people who had sat down in the White House driveway 
in unlawful, effective dissent against nukes. 
What happens next? I certainly don't know. But it 
comforts me to remember, the SALT talks looming in 
the back of my mind, that only twenty years ago smaller 
demonstrations than the ones taking place since the 
Eleven's arrest last September launched the Sixties, the 
definitive break with the first Cold War, the Age of 
Rock, the movement against the war in Vietnam. And it 
was the movement, here and in Indochina, that broke 
the war. It is not impossible that it could happen again. 
This article is reprinted from The Real Paper, Boston 
alternative weekly. 
(continued from pap l) 
many Kampuchean people and, on the other side of the 
ledger, incessant border skirmishes (often initiated by a 
fearfully belligerent Kampuchea) which added signifi-
cantly to Vietnam's already critical food situation and 
reconstruction problems. Additionally, what is at issue 
and at stake is the social order and domestic policies of 
Kampuchea. 
Most concerned observers are caught in a conflict of 
disapprovals, between disapproval of the Kampuchean 
regime's highly regimented collectivist social order sanc-
tioned to some considerable extent by violence and fear, 
and disapproval of Vietnam's invasion and apparent 
political-military success in driving the Pol Pot regime 
from Phnom Penh and replacing it with a Kampuchean 
leadership more willing to cooperate with Vietnam both 
bilaterally and, presumably, with regard to foreign 
policy. 
The Carter administration which has during the last 
year taken the lead in condemning human rights abuses 
in Democratic Kampuchea, calling Kampuchea the 
''world's worst human rights off ender,'' is now similarly 
caught in a dilemma between its condemnation of that 
regime and pursuing the longstanding geopolitical stra-
tegy that regards the Moscow-Havana-Hanoi alignment 
as the greatest longterm danger to the free world and 
U.S. interests. Thus we find Richard Holbrook stating 
that "We do not wish to suggest any form of support for 
it" [The Kampuchean regime of Pol Pot - ed.], but at 
the same time explaining that the U.S. views a Cam-
bodian state as a legitimate part of the independent 
system of states in Asia and that "a generation ahead we 
would hope that there would be a Cambodian state.'' 1 
So in spite of recently avowed U.S. neutrality in the 
Vietnam-Kampuchea war the United States clearly does 
not want to see Vietnam control or dominate Cambodia 
and has attempted to exert pressure against Vietnam by 
taking the war "into account in deciding the past of 
normalization of relations with Vietnam ... " 2 which 
clearly means further delaying normalization. The U.S. 
failure to normalize with Vietnam has both pushed 
Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union and rendered U.S. 
influence on the leadership of Vietnam negligible. That 
may be an unwanted result, but several observers have 
pointed out that another possibility is that some U.S. 
"national security" strategists have deliberately sought 
to push Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union, both to 
descredit Vietnam in the eyes of third world countries, 
and so that a China fearing encirclement would move 
more readily toward the U.S. 
There are at least three questions of particular impor-
tance that should be considered as we attempt to 
formulate our thinking about recent events in the 
Vietnam-Kampuchea war. 
1. Will the new Kampuchea United Front for National 
Salvation (KUFNS) actually turn out to be dom-
inated by Vietnam, and if so what will be the domes-
tic implications and the regional implications. 
Regarding regional implications, would a Vietnam-
Kampuchea "militant solidarity" then become an 
objectionable threat to the' 'peace and stability of the 
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region?" How do the neighboring nations feel? 
2. What way out of a protracted conflict would result in 
the least deaths and suffering and yet result in a social 
order that the Kampuchean people would support 
and that would respect the fundamental rights of all 
persons? 
3. If the Pol Pot regime is able to fight a protracted 
guerilla war is there any serious possibility of re-
solving this war by compromise through negotia-
tions? 
Before we attempt to make some suggestions about 
how these questions might be answered, perhaps it would 
be well to review what can be understood with some 
degree of probability regarding the issues and origins of 
this war. 
The ideological differences which we believe to be at 
the root of this conflict are stated differently by the two 
sides, but it is nevertheless not impossible to discern the 
basic issues. Democratic Kampuchea accuses Vietnam of 
wishing to make Kampuchea "a satellite," of wishing to 
control or "swallow up" Kampuchea under the concept 
of an ''Indochina Federation,'' or under the concept of a 
"special relation." They say that Vietnam "is an integral 
part of the bloc of the big expansionist,'' meaning the 
Soviet Union, and allege that Vietnam has an identical 
ideology with the Soviet Union and that Vietnam is a 
member of the same economic, political, and military 
alliance. · 
Democratic Kampuchea portrays itself as a people and 
revolutionary army which has made "many sacrifices to 
liberate themselves, secure the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of their country and · protect 
their honor and dignity" and a nation which resolutely 
refused to become "the slaves of the Vietnamese or any 
major Power. " 3 The leaders appeal to the international 
community to constrain Vietnam and support their 
"independence struggle" on the basis that Vietnamese 
expansionism would inevitably have harmful conse-
quences all over the world. They have warned that 
Vietnam and "its master" will not fail to expand into all 
South East Asia if they take Kampuchea. Significantly 
Norodom Sihanouk has very recently repeated this 
warning, even as he disassociated himself completely 
with the domestic policies of the Pol Pot regime. 
Vietnam's presentation of what is at issue is consider-
ably more sophisticated and rather more oblique than 
that of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese note that in 1974 
Pol Pol pledged that "In all sincerity and from the 
bottom of my heart, I can assure you that in all circum-
stances, I will remain faithful to the line of great 
solidarity and of fraternal and revolutionary friendship 
between Kampuchea and Vietnam, whatever the diffi-
culties and adversities we may encounter. " 4 The Vietna-
mese blame "a third party" - China - for much of the 
deterioration in the Khmer/Viet relationship. They 
accuse Kampuchea of carrying out a "proxy anti-
Vietnamese war ... " and have stated that the "only 
obstacle to a peaceful settlement between the two coun-
tries is the policy of a great Power in Asia that has long 
had ambitions of expansion and hegemony in South-
East Asia, ... "s Additionally, the Vietnamese have 
accused the Kampuchean authorities of fomenting strife 
with Vietnam in order to repress and liquidate as 
''pro-Vietnamese,'' legitimate Kampuchean opponents 
of Pol Pot's "criminal" domestic policies, and in 
general to control the population in the face of wide-
spread unhappiness with those harsh policies. The Pol 
Pot government has not commented, but must have 
seen the estimated 8,000 Khmer cadres who returned to 
Kampuchea in 1970, after years of training in North 
Vietnam, as a Vietnamese "fifth column." Presumably, 
it was primarily these people who were the target of the 
Pol Pot-directed 1977 purge and program of liquidation 
which is thought to have eliminated most of them. 
All of the above might seem at first glance to indicate 
that there is very little common understanding of the 
conflict on the part of the leadership of the belligerent 
nations. However, a close reading of passages such as 
the following ones reveals that, though they word it 
quite differently, the Vietnamese and Kampucheans 
have a very similar understanding of the real issues. 
In a section of the Vietnam Courier's Kampuchea 
Dossier entitled "The Kampuchean Authorities' Allega-
tion about a So-called "Vietnam-dominated Indochina 
Federation with Only One Party, One State, and One 
People Is Completely Groundless" we find this reveal-
ing statement: 
"The policy of fanning national hatred and enmity 
between Kampuchea and Vietnam and sabotaging the 
friendship between the two peoples is part of their 
policy of creating border conflicts with neighboring 
countries, applying a closed-door foreign policy, en-
hancing narrow nationalism and rejecting interna-
tional cooperation (such as co-operation on the 
Mekong River) ... ~ [emphasis ours - ed.] 
And elsewhere in the same volume: 
"The authorities in Phnom Penh pride themselves on 
their political line, which they describe as being 
"based on independence, sovereignty and the princi-
ple of relying on our own strength." [But - ed.] ... 
Genuine patriotism necessarily implies international-
ism. Reverting to outmoded chauvinism and leaving 
the path of militant solidarity wi~h nations fighting 
against imperialism - as the Kampuchea rulers are 
now doing - can only lead to the orbit of the 
imperialists and reactionaries ... " 1 
"Leaving the path of militant solidarity with nations 
fighting against imperialism" is the same charge that 
Vietnam makes of China. 
We personally have formulated the following some-
what peculative theory about the development of the 
Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict - a theory which is not 
terribly flattering to either side. 
The French educated side of the Kampuchean Com-
munist Party (KCP), the side which has been dominant 
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have considered Vietnam's tendency to subordinate 
Kampuchean interests to those of Vietnam. Also, they 
have long been critical of all aspects of Soviet-style 
communism including Soviet internationalism which 
they likely believe masks a Soviet will to dominate. The 
KCP came to believe that international socialist integra-
tion with a relatively advanced Vietnam with roughly six 
times the population of Kampuchea and favorably 
inclined toward Soviet policies was not in Kampuchean 
interests, especially with respect to Kampuchean sover-
eignty or "honor and dignity." In fact we believe that it 
can be shown that the draconian style of Khmer social-
ism was, in part, formulated by the KCP precisely in 
order to be able to resist being drawn into a relationship 
with Vietnam in which Kampuchea would ultimately 
lose its independence and sovereignty. While the Pol 
Pot regime's fears were not unfounded it seems obvious 
that the regime so overdid its resistance to Vietnam that 
it became highly provocative and vulnerable. 
As the earlier quoted excerpt of Pol Pot's 1974 letter 
to Le Due Tho shows, wartime cooperation with Viet-
nam led to a considerable degree of solidarity. But as a 
line in a later letter hints - "The relations between our 
two Parties, based on mutual respect and absolute non-
interference in each other's internal affairs ... " 8 the 
Kampuchean leadership nevertheless intended to pursue 
a policy of radical independence which involved a very 
different domestic policy from that of Vietnam's more 
traditional (and Soviet) style of communism. While 
Vietnam did not at all approve of Kampuchea's domes-
tic policy, considering it infantile and destined to be-
smear socialism if not downright inhuman, it seems 
likely that Vietnam would have been willing to let it be if 
only Kampuchea would accede to a few rectifications, 
accept a certain level of bilateral development coopera-
tion, and join Vietnam in a common regional strategy 
based on the concept of socialist internationalist respon-
sibility and ''militant solidarity.'' 
It seems to us likely (the following is speculative, 
though it offers a cogent overall explanation for what 
has occurred) that Vietnam would have pressed Kam-
puchea quite hard in negotiations, and sometimes in 
1976 the Kampuchean leaders began to feel threatened 
and to react strongly. In order to further pressure Pol 
Pot & company Vietnam may have also decided to 
ignore the agreements both the NLF and the DRY made 
with Kampuchea in 1967 which, in return for Kam-
puchea's renouncement of any claim to large areas that 
had been taken from Kampuchea in the French delinea-
tion of the border, would have given Kampuchea full 
authority to delineate the border in a few small areas 
where the line was unclear. To do this the Vietnamese 
simply needed to resist withdrawing from ambiguous 
areas and to call for further negotiations, which would 
have sounded very reasonable to all except the Kam-
pucheans, who had given up all claim to vast areas 
(Kampuchea Krom) in southern Vietnam precisely in 
order to avoid the negotiability of further minor 
disputes. 
"This policy was designed to put a definitive end to 
what were perceived as Vietnam's (and Thailand's) 
'traditional' salami tactics of making a series of 
ostensibly reasonable demands for minor readjust-
ments that ultimately add up to major territorial 
losses. " 9 
The Kampucheans may also have been dismayed or 
infuriated by Vietnamese claims regarding the delinea-
tion of the off shore boundaries between the two 
countries. 
Then perhaps both in order to demonstrate their firm 
resolve on the question of the nature of the relation 
between Kampuchea and Vietnam and to demonstrate 
their resolve to hold Vietnam to its 1967 border agree-
ments, the Kampucheans likely ordered their troops 
(perhaps ·using some euphemistic language which the 
troops might interpret as they saw fit) to resolve the 
border question in disputed areas. The military actions 
and tragic large scale atrocities that ensued not only 
deeply angered the Vietnamese but ultimately set the 
stage for a limited military action which made it possible 
for great numbers of Kampucheans to take refuge in 
Vietnam. Though many persons fled on their own 
Nayan Chanda told us that some Kampuchean refugees 
with whom he had spoken had reported leaving Kam-
puchea by Vietnamese military trucks. The large Khmer 
refugee population in Vietnam, and the population in 
areas of Kampuchea which came to be controlled mili-
tarily be Vietnam for a time, then became the basis on 
which Vietnam could support and encourage the forma-
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tion of an anti-Pol Pot Front. Another even more 
important source of anti-Pol Pot personnel were the 
survivors of the paranoic anti-Vietnamese purges within 
the KCP during the spring of 1977. 
In September (1978) Nayan Chanda wrote that 
"Cambodia's survival as a counterweight to Vietnam 
has since 1956 been the cornerstone to Peking's policy 
toward Indochina." 10 In our view China's role in the 
development of this conflict is not at all insignificant. 
(And there is no evidence that the Soviets played a 
similar role.) Though the Chinese may not have wholly 
approved of Pol Pot's domestic policy (the basis of the 
relationship from the Kampuchean side was that China 
would not attempt to interfere with domestic policy) 
China undoubtedly discouraged Kampuchean coopera-
tion with Vietnam, encouraged the proclivity of Kam-
puchean leaders to take a tough anti-Vietnam stance, 
and made it clear to the Pol Pot leadership that China 
would support Kampuchea's stand on the border ques-
tion. When that truculent stand led to border atrocities 
and military conflict with Vietnam, China must have 
further assured Kampuchea of support. Personally we 
know that just before the visit of the late Chou En-Lai's 
wife - Teng Ying-chao - to Phnom Penh in mid-
January 1978 the Vietnamese and many other observers, 
including U.S. intelligence analysts, thought that China 
was reconsidering its support of Phnom Penh's anti-
Vietnam truculence. At that time the Vietnamese told us 
privately that "We will not be split from China" and 
appeared to be seriously hoping and hopeful that China 
would back off from full support for Kampuchea and 
continued militarization of the conflict. But after Teng 
Ying-chao's January 18th press conference in Phnom 
Penh the Vietnamese apparently found their hopes 
dashed and returned to their former posture vis-a-vis 
both Kampuchea and China. 
The United States has not remained completely un-
involved in the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict. During 
his recent trip to China Zbigniew Brzezinski told 
Chinese leaders that "we recognize and share China's 
resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to 
establish global or regional hegemony,'''' and there can 
be little doubt but that 'regional hegemony' was aimed 
at Vietnam. In fact we can say that there has existed a 
measure of "de facto U.S. support, via China, for 
communist Kampuchea against communist Vietnam," ' 2 
though the United States does not wish to see the 
conflict escalate into a major Sino-Soviet confronta-
tion. Avowed U.S. neutrality in the conflict notwith-
standing, the recent U.S. condemnation of Vietnam's 
invasion has as its basis not the principle of military 
intervention in another nation (we are more than well 
prepared to do that in many situations) but rather 
regional and global anti-Soviet alliance strategic con-
siderations. 
Returning to the questions posed earlier, we would 
like to suggest the following. Firstly, the new Kam-
puchean United Front for National Salvation will 
shortly need to demonstrate that it is patriotic, has 
Kampuchean interests at heart, and is not simply a 
puppet of Vietnam in spite of the fact that these people 
surely share much of the Vietnamese outlook and have 
had full Vietnamese military support. After the Pol Pot 
era the new domestic policy will likely win for the new 
government of Kampuchea a significant degree of 
domestic support and even gratitude, and in our view 
this will off set or ameliorate in considerable measure 
anti-Vietnam animosities and apprehensions, providing 
that the Vietnam Army conducts itself as it has in the 
past and withdraws from Kampuchea at an early date. 
If the Pol Pot regime proves to have the means to 
survive the present offensive in a form that would 
enable it to conduct the protracted guerilla struggle that 
has been threatened - and we believe it will - it would 
seem to us that this will never amount to more than a 
spoiling action that would cost the Kampuchean people 
much additional suffering. But in such event we think 
that the AFSC should do everything in our power to 
encourage an early rather than late compromise arounc' 
the figure of Norodom Sihanouk, who, in spite of 
recent statements, might well be acceptable to Viet-
namese and to the KUFNS if threatened with a pro-
tracted struggle, and who would almost surely be 
acceptable to the Chinese who must see that Pol Pot will 
never again take Phnom Penh. Also Sihanouk likely 
remains highly acceptable to the people of Kampuchea. 
Even if there never should be a compromise built 
around Sihanouk, it would seem to us that there is not 
yet any evidence that fears of a continuing direct 
Vietnamese expansion are realistic. Laos and Kam-
puchea border Vietnam and non-hostile governments in 
those two countries are seen by Vietnam as essential to 
the well-being of Vietnam, in much the same way that 
the United States sees it as essential that Canada and 
Mexico remain non-hostile. Cooperation between the 
three Indochinese countries was in fact essential to the 
victory of the Vietnamese revolution as those in Laos 
and Kampuchea. Beyond that, the Vietnamese policy of 
"militant solidarity" would probably be a threat to 
neighboring nations only if the internal situation in 
those countries deteriorates sharply as the result of 
domestic factors, though we must temper this judgment 
with the caution that long term behavior on the part of 
nations has not proved to be very predictable. 
In the recent past and at present the non-Communist 
nations in the region have tended to regard Vietnam as 
the most significant threat. But if the Chinese are 
successful in supporting a protracted resistance to the 
Vietnamese in Kampuchea, regional fears of Chinese 
power may come to the fore. Thus it may be that 
ASEAN nations would feel most secure if a China-
Vietnam balance is struck. 
It seems clear that if Sihanouk were to have a 
significant share of power in a compromise Kam-
puchean government the ASEAN nations, the People's 
Republic of China, Australia and the United States 
would feel much more comfortable regarding the long 
term security of the status quo in the region, since direct 
Vietnamese influence would then be pretty much limited 
to Kampuchea and Laos only. 
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(But we should not confuse the security of the status 
quo in the region with the good of the people. In our 
view it is just as much of a mistake to support a 
militarily maintained status quo perpetuating serious 
social and economic inequities - as the U.S. does now 
- as it would be to support a socialist military inter-
ference.) 
We think the AFSC should strongly urge that (1.) the 
United States desist from any encouragement of further 
support for a protracted guerilla struggle against the 
new government of Kampuchea; (2.) that the United 
States should recognize the new government of Kam-
puchea if it stabilizes and normalizes relations with 
Vietnam; (3.) that the United States should offer imme-
diate humanitarian assistance to Kampuchea and food 
aid to Vietnam. Only such a full turn-about from the 
present U.S. policy of animosity towards Vietnam, a 
policy which has caused a great deal of suffering, and 
exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems of the 
region, will bring hope that the people of Vietnam, 
Kampuchea and the region may be spared further 
suffering. 
(10 January 1979) 
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A packet reprinting 30 articles on the conflicts between 
Vietnam, China, and Kampuchea, including the one 
printed above, is available for $1.50 from the Ad Hoc 
Viet Nam Support Committee, P.O. Box 129, Dor-
chester, MA 02122. 
If you wish to continue receiving the newsletter, don't forget to renew your subscription! 
GRANTS 
UNION W.A.G.E. (PO Box 40904, San francisco, CA 
94140). 
The Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality (WAGE) 
was founded in 1971 by San Francisco Bay Area women 
who felt that the existing feminist organizations were not 
meeting the needs of working-class women, including 
housewives, the unemployed, retired, and those on 
welfare. Their emphasis has been on helping women 
organize into unions and gain power in their unions. 
Their bi-monthly newspaper ($3.50/year) is one of the 
most useful and readable on the left. Union WAGE is 
organized by chapters, and has been expanding into a 
national organization. Resist's grant was to support their 
February convention, which brought members from all 
over the country to determine the future direction of the 
national organization. 
PUERTO RICO SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE (Box 
319, Cooper Station, New York, NY, 10003). 
The Puerto Rico Solidarity Committee supports the 
independence movements in Puerto Rico, calling for 
complete US withdrawal from that island. They have 
chapters in NY, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and other cities, and publish 
Puerto Rico Libre!, one of the best sources of news on 
the liberation struggle. At their June, 1978 national 
meeting they decided to focus their work on three areas: 
raising the status of Puerto Rico at the United Nations; 
organizing support for the fishermen of the island of 
Vieques, who object to the use of their island for 
bombing and target practice by the Navy; and supporting 
the Puerto Rico trade union movement. Resist's grant 
will support a circulation campaign to increase the 
readership of Puerto Rico Libre! 
COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF 
BERLIN'S LABOR HISTORY (34 Main St., Cascade, 
Gorham, NH 03581 ). 
Berlin is known as the "paper city", and is the major 
industrial center of northern New Hampshire. It has also 
been a center of political activism, including a vigorous 
Socialist Party just prior to World War I, and what was 
probably the largest Farmer-Labor party of any US city, 
dominating city government from 1936 to 1943 . The 
Committee for the Preservation of Berlin's Labor His-
tory has prepared several exhibits of photographic and 
other reminders of this past, and has prepared a short 
booklet to accompany a slide show program and poster 
display geared to schools. ·Resist's grant is for general 
support of this activity. 
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FIGHT BACK GI PROJECT (Ingrimstr. 28, 2900 
Heidelberg, West Germany). 
Fight Back GI has organized among American soldiers 
stationed in Germany since the Vietnam War era. Resist 
has supported them several times in the past. This grant 
was to support printing and distributing information 
about the situation in Iran, at a time when there was the 
prospect that US troops stationed in Germany might be 
part of an American military intervention in Iran. 
PORTLAND TENANTS UNION (834 S.E. Ash, 2nd 
floor, Portland, OR 97214). 
The Portland Tenants Union has been aiding tenants for 
three years. Their work includes educational work, 
advocating more low income housing from the city, and 
holding community workshops on tenants' rights. They 
are now focusing their organizing on Housing Authority 
buildings, the black community, and other poor neigh-
borhoods in Portland. The Union itself is composed of 
locals of tenants activists, as well as individual or 
household tenant union members. They also maintain a 
telephone hotline for tenant problems, and have pub-
lished a handbook of tenants' rights. Resist's grant is to 
support publication of their newspaper, The Tenants 
Voice. 
ABORTION ACTION COALITION (PO Box 2727, 
Boston, MA 02208). 
The Abortion Action Coalition is one of several organi-
zations which has been working toward the formation of 
a national network to coordinate struggles around repro-
ductive rights issues. Resist's grant to the AAC is to cover 
the costs of printing and mailing information on repro-
ductive rights issues, and on the activities of organiza-
tions concerned with these issues. The efforts of the AAC 
and other organizations led to the formation in late 
February of the Reproductive Rights National Network. 
The RRNN plans a national petition campaign to defeat 
the Hyde Amendment (which has cut off federal funds 
for most medicaid abortions for the past two years); a 
combined counter demonstration and conference at the 
national "Right to Life" convention in Cincinnati on 
June 23; and a fall mobilization to be planned with other 
coalitions and organizations, focusing on the defeat of 
the Hyde Amendment. Hyde Amendment petitions may 
be obtained from the AAC; to contact the Reproductive 
Rights National Network, write to 3244 N. Clark St., 
Chicago, IL 60657. 
